Hungarian nationalism has reached saturation point. With the EU parliamentary elections due to take place this weekend, the extent to which racist nationalism dominates the discourse of Hungarian political parties across the ideological spectrum should be cause for concern. In the initial post-Communist period, the consensus in the American community of "experts" (including gentlemen as diverse as Jeffrey Sachs and Samuel P. Huntington) viewed Hungary as a well-developed, "Western" state with a high probability of successful transition to a liberal, market-based democracy. US investors were given the green-light to start sending dollars to Hungary.
Given the toted similarities between American and Hungarian values, the rise of racist nationalism in Hungary calls for a bit of self-reckoning on the part of the American academics who elevated the Hungarian transition to the status of an ideal model. US administrations have chosen to look the other way and ignore the obviously xenophobic and nationalist ideologies employed by Hungarian politicians for too long. It is time to take stock of the rather illiberal scene and encourage critical thinking about illiberal European societies.
Jobbik : The Movement for a Better Hungary
Founded in 2003, Jobbik defines itself as a values-oriented national Christian party that uses radical means to protect and preserve the Hungarian national interest. While Jobbik takes pride in its "nationalism", its members insist that it is a healthy nationalism-- not the type which degenerates into chauvinism or racism. Engaging a large number of Hungarian students, Jobbik puts a premium on action. One of its first big actions was the erection of crosses all over Hungary for Christmas 2003 by which the party wanted to draw public attention to the Christian message of the holiday. Two years later, Jobbik set up the Cabinet for the Protection of Children, whose leader, Attila Begany, sported a Zorro mask while using a spray gun to mark the initials JZ (for Jobbik-Zorro) on several public places which Begany deemed to constitute offenses against public morals.
As a candidate in the European Parliament elections, Dr. Krizstina Morvai does not shy away from taking a public stand in favor of nationalism and a "Hungary for Hungarians". In an interview posted on the front page of the Jobbik website, Dr. Morvai declares:
Our programme has two mottos. One is: “Hungary belongs to the Hungarians”. That demonstrates strong national identity, and makes it clear that we no longer want to serve international high finance in such a way that Hungary becomes a colony, the people sink into poverty and become slaves in their our country. The other motto is “a way of thinking based on people and community instead of money and profit”. The question should not be what is good in terms of maximising profits, but of what is good for people. This includes, for example, representing the interests of employees, aiding companies and consumer protection - those are all question which affect the dignity and the meaning of human lives. Other political forces think in terms of profit. That is the real dividing line today, rather than the question of whether somebody is rightwing or leftwing. In my view it follows directly from this focus on people that we should turn from global to local, and defend local interests, the local economy and the rights of local people.
Dr. Morvai's language is strikingly similar to the language of European fascist parties during the interwar period. In addition to
constant reference to "a small global elite" and the controlling influence of "global finance", Morvai demands a return to a local economy unsullied by the EU bureaucracy or the global financial elite. (It should be noted that interwar fascists used the words "financial elite" as a coded reference to Jews.) Playing on anti-Communist sentiment, press releases affirm the "bolshevik" character of the current government. The image to the right, which glorifies the significance of a powerful police force to "care for" society, is disturbingly familiar.
When it comes to relations with neighboring Romania, and the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, Dr. Morvai's statements offer cause for concern, primarily because she entirely skirts the issue. When asked how she will work with the freakish Greater Romania Party (Romania's version of Jobbik) in the European Parliament, given the Greater Romania Party's stand against the rights of ethnic minorities in Transylvania, Morvai tries to make a "joke"; the punchline is as funny as children wearing t-shirts with images of dead fetuses to school. Despite the extremely inflammatory and nationalist rhetoric employed by Hungarians across the political spectrum when referring to the Hungarian minority in Transylvania, Dr. Morvai goes so far as to claim that her "own state is also against protecting the interests of the Hungarians".
Dr. Morvai's refusal to address this question directly indicates that Jobbik does not intend to make common cause with other nationalist European parties. Unfortunately, Jobbik would choose to refrain from nationalist alliance-building with Corneliu Vadim Tudor's party if their plan for the Hungarian minority in Transylvania included territorial goals. Granted, this sounds extreme, especially given Dr. Morvai's friendly smile and pro-Western highlights, but historical responsibility requires us to take the past into consideration when anticipating the future.
Like the National Socialist Party in interwar Germany, Jobbik uses fear of job insecurity, crime, and chaos to build a case for a strong national government which will protect "Hungarians". Of course, Hungarians, in the case, are strictly defined to exclude Roma, Jews, and other such "internationals".Jobbik's campaign against usury almost suggests that race and ethnicity are directly correlated with likelihood of charging high interest rates, a bizarre view to be sure.
Their political platform makes for a chilling read. Apart from references to the independent country of Transylvania, Jobbik's pledges provide a focused campaign to remove all foreign culture, finance, and influence from Hungary. The platform specifically aims "to reunite Hungarians beyond the borders of Hungary and to recover from the disaster suffered in Trianon", further elaborated as the "Treaty signed in 1920 about dissecting the country into pieces". Among other kooky, spine-tingling details, Jobbik pledges to:
- "nationalize strategic industries"
- "stop liberalization in energy sectors"
- "allocate operating capital to out of border Hungarian and foreign regions"
- "modify Hungarian earth laws and hinder foreign earth purchase"
- "replace the current constitution with one based on Szent-Korona doctrines"
- "legally protect the foetus from conception"
- "restart and prime support of the test-tube baby program"
- "restrain immigration of population incapable of assimilation"
- "to operate a universal, value-based system of media"
- "introduce obligatory moral and religious education in primary and secondary education"
- "to erect a National Institute of Ancient History to support research in proving the Avar-Hungarian historical continuity"
- "to stipulate and provide legal protection for the Hungarian Sacra-Corona, the Turul, and the Arpad-striped flag (ancient Hungarian symbols)"
- "to provide central financial support to performances, plays, and musical pieces of art that authentically show Hungarian history"
- "to restore death-penalty in case of life-threatening acts"
- "to involve prison inmates in public labor"
- "to tighten the Penal Code for the benefit of life, safety, and property"
- "to establish a corporate police unit for gypsy prosecution in the critical areas"
- "to support the endeavors of autonomy of beyond-border Hungarians'
- "to declare the Arpad-striped flag a Hungarian national symbol"
Among Romanians who have managed to convince themselves that Hungarian nationalists are merely toothless and ornery curmudgeons, Jobbik's foreign policy is sure to ruin a few dinner parties. Jobbik's website points to the year 2011 as a time of great international influence for Hungary, who will assume the rotating presidency of the European Union. The Foreign Policy Committee cannot afford to be modest:
By that time we expect Jobbik to be represented not only in the European Parliament, but also in the Hungarian National Assembly as an unavoidable parliamentary faction. This ground breaking opportunity will allow Jobbik in partnership with its strong traditional and new allies, the means to support and advocate the efforts of Hungarian minorities outside the country, historically deprived of their rights of self-determination and governance.
Responding to the murder of handball player Marian Cozma earlier this year, Jobbik did not bother to name the murderers, describing them instead as "criminals of Roma origin". The Nazis promised to restore public order and reign in the socialist agitators and labor unions which were disrupting city life. Likewise, Jobbik promises to make it their priority to "establish public safety". The word choice is significant-- "establishing" safety carries a more heavy-handed tone than merely "ensuring" public safety. For older Hungarians and those disturbed by the diversity of modern liberal democracy, "establish" suggests an almost-comforting authoritarian approach to reordering society. The press release conveys the loving embrace of a police state in which prisons are cruel and capital punishment returns to the hands of the state:
Jobbik would make it our priority in the Parliament to establish public safety. Strong police in the country and the reinstation of the gendarmerie in the countryside.There is a need for the reconsideration of legal punishments for serious crimes in the Justice system and to speed up the court cases. Jobbik will stop the current system of “wellness”-prisons where perpetrators go to the gym and watch TV in between committing their crimes. If it’s necessary, Jobbik will look into the revision of legal agreements regarding the capital punishment in serious, classified crime cases.
Though some supporters have made much of the fact that Dr. Morvai is married to a Jew, this simple fact does not absolve her (and Jobbik) of responsibility for the xenophobic and authoritarian positions which they embrace. The lawsuit filed by Dr. Morvai in the Hungarian Supreme Court against the leaders and military commanders of Israel appeals to the human-rights community. On the other hand, the lawsuit is also quite appealing to anti-Semites who wish to punish Hungarian Jews by confiscating their assets and property. Dr. Morvai explicity calls upon the Chief Justice to implement regulations "preventing Israeli war criminals" from acquiring property or possessions in Hungary, and freezing any assets they may have already acquired. Anyone familiar with Israeli politics knows that military service in the Israeli Defense Forces is mandatory for most citizens. Dr. Morvai's lawsuit aims to brush all Israelis who have completed their service time in the IDF with the war criminals brush, thereby drastically decreasing the economic role of Jews in Hungary.
The Hungarian Political Spectrum: A Cursory Introduction to Political Parties & Alliances
Jobbik is not alone. In fact, the Hungarian right and center-right offers a bounty of choices for local nationalists. The openly anti-Semitic MIEP (Hungarian
Justice and Life Party) uses hardcore nationalism to put forth its platform as well. Founded in 1993 as a split from the Hungarian Democratic Forum, MIEP entered parliament for the first time in 1998. The fact that it entered parliament at all, given its blatant anti-Semitism, is disappointing. In 2005, MIEP joined with Jobbik to form the Third Way Alliance.
FKGP (Independent Smallholders' Party) is an agrarian populist party that resides right of center on the ideological spectrum. In the Fidesz-led government of 1998-2002, FKGP was one of the junior parties. In the run-up to the 2002 election, allegations of corruption side-lined FKGP. In 2005, the FKGP also joined up with Jobbik and the Hungarian Justice and Life Party as part of the conservative, Christian, nationalist Third Way Alliance.
Closely allied to Fidesz, the
KDNP (Christian Democratic People's Party) was originally established in 1944 and reformed after the fall of communism in 1989. But don't be fooled by its left-leaning name. In fact, KDNP owes Fidesz a few favors, since before the 2006 election, the two parties struck a deal which placed KDNP representatives in parliament.
The
MDF (Hungarian Democratic Forum) is a Christian-conservative part to the right of center which led the 1990-1994 administration in Hungary. As a splinter part of the Hungarian Democratic Front created in 1996 (not to be confused with MDF), the MDNP (Hungarian Democratic People's Party) contested the 2002 election as part of the electoral list the Centre alliance.
The MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) is one of the few successful reformed communist parties in Europe. In 1994, the Hungarian Socialist Party was elected to office amid concerns that it might return to communist policies. Surprisingly, the MSZP chose to prioritize relations with the European Union and international organizations. Implementing the difficult economic reforms required to join international markets, the MSZP secured IMF loans and boosted investor confidence in Hungary's economic growth.
The Mainstreaming of Hungarian Nationalism: Orban, Fidesz, and the Lack of a Deeply-Rooted Liberalism
Hungary lacks a significant democratic liberal opposition-- a potential political liability in times of economic struggle and social strife.
Recent polls even go so far as to warn that liberals might not win any seats in the upcoming elections. A
poll published last Tuesday revealed that Fidesz has 71% of the popular support while the currently-ruling Socialist party has only 17%. In fact, the most liberal party on the scene is Centre, an alliance-based party established in 2001 with the cooperation of KNDP, the MDNP, and the Greens. Only the Greens have campaigned without reference to Hungarian nationalism and ethnic exclusivism.
While the Hungarian Socialist Party has focused its efforts on supporting a European identity for Hungarians, almost all political parties to the center and right play to the firmly Hungarian identity politics. In fact, the most notable difference between the left and the right in Hungary does not hinge on support for free markets-- their economic approaches are remarkably similar. Instead, the critical difference lies in the extent to which the left represents a multi-ethnic and European component to national identity, while the center and right represent a strictly ethnic approach to Hungarian national identity. Granted, there is an economic component to the identity-politics approach. Hungarian liberals tend to support more international trade, while the Third Way Alliance prefers a return to a strictly national economy in which the dread "international finance" plays a more marginal role.
One... is the fact that there are many right-wing elements within the government, who secretly or outright support the racist views and refuse to battle their perpetrators seriously. The other reason is that during the regime change of the 90s, the lawmakers viewed freedom of speech and expression as an absolute priority, and to this day don't provide protection to the victims of the misuse of this freedom.
Viktor Orban, who was Prime Minister from 1998 - 2002, and now heads the leading "opposition" party, Fidesz, (a.k.a. Federation of Young Democrats) stoked the fires of nationalism to great effect during his political campaigns. In fact, when Orban became a member of the Hungarian parliament in 1990, he transformed Fidesz from a liberal party into a right-wing, conservative party. In 1995, the party changed its name to Fidesz-MPP, reflecting a new rightist alliance between Fidesz and the Hungarian Civic Party.
In an article about Viktor Orban's ideological turn-around, former mentor Miklos Haraszti explains how the politician who used a Roxette song for his first campaign came to embrace nepotism. Rather than push for economic freedom, Orban used public funding to pick his market favorites, resulting in a mild and inefficient corporatism. Orban's administration, according to Haraszti, "behaved vis-a-vis the economy in a plundering way that was almost far-left in character". In addition to re-nationalizing a large part of the economy, Orban and friends also used tremendous amounts of taxpayers' money to assist private, "friendly" companies. This sneaky transfer made public control and accountability impossible. To ensure a lack of transparency, Orban "used loopholes and unconstitutionally majoritarian institutional and legislative coups".
Unfortunately, Orban's ruling of the Hungarian Right has not succeeded in cementing a coalition for political and economic freedom. Instead, as Haraszti observes, Orban presides over a Hungarian Right which bears far too close a resemble to European fascism.
It is appropriate to talk about Orbán’s völkisch politics, albeit not at the root (as alleged by Scruton) but at the end of Orbán’s journey to unify the country’s right-wing forces. For the dilemma that has transfixed the country for the last three years was whether or not he would govern with the help of István Csurka’s far-right Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP) after the 2002 elections. Csurka’s party slipped into Parliament in 1998 with slightly more votes than the required five per cent threshold, and for four years it acted as an open supporter of Orbán’s government from the “opposition” benches. MIÉP defines itself as “Not Left, Not Right, Just Christian and Hungarian”; it is anti-western, anti-capitalist, anti-communist and anti-liberal, and believes all these enemies are either Jewish or commanded by Jews. Orbán has not solicited MIÉP’s support, but in exchange for it he refused to distance himself from Csurka’s views, and filled the state media with Csurka’s propagandists and their hate hours against the “Liberalbolsheviks”.
In the 2002 elections, Csurka’s party, although it did not diminish in support, could not jump the threshold because of the high turnout. MIÉP’s ejection from Parliament ended the trepidation that after the election, if parliamentary mathematics demands it, Orbán might formalise his cooperation with Csurka’s party (just as his best friend Wolfgang Schussel, the leader of the Austrian centre-right People’s Party, coalesced with far-right Jorg Haider’s Freedom Party).
In 2000, the BBC noted the conflict over media control in the Hungarian political realm-- a conflict which Orban resolved in favor of the Right. Currently, Fidesz is calling for early elections in Hungary-- a demand which reflects their confidence in their electoral position. Orban views the economic downturn as an opportunity for a political comeback. As Tony Barber notes, most Europeans aren't exactly enthusiastic about this weekend's elections. Usually, this means that the moderate middle will stay at home while the extremists and ideologues will be scurrying to the polls.
The future reeks of Viktor Orban, xenophobia, and nationalism. When Orban declared that Hungary's MEP's will represent "all Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin", the Czech government did not bother to hide its discontent with his statement. Almost 6,000 foreign nationals have already registered to vote in Hungary's EP elections, a significant voting constituency which historically leans right. Strong irredentist positions characterize many Hungarian minorities in neighboring states, including Romania, the Czech Republic, Germany, and Slovakia, to name a few.
When President Laszlo Solyom met with ethnic Hungarian MEPs Edit Bauer (from Slovakia) and Laszlo Tokes (from Romania) last week, the ethnic nationalism advocated by the Hungarian MEPs was hard to hide. Or ignore. In a follow-up interview with MTI, Bauer reported that she "had been stunned" by the Slovak Prime Minister's recent statement decrying Orban's meeting with MKP leader Pal Csaky as a "threat to Slovakia's territorial integrity". On Bauer's view, "it was completely natural in the EU that related parties help each other during their EP campaigns". Romanian-Hungarian MEP Tokes told MTI that he had informed President Solyom "about the current mass lay-offs of ethnic Hungarian officials in Romania". Calling the policies of the Romanian and Slovakian governments "alien to Europe", Tokes reported that President Solyom is "ready to stand up for ethnic Hungarians beyond the borders whenever their interests are violated".
In a recent interview, Orban explained rising support for Jobbik in terms of social bitterness-- "ordinary people feel that the state no longer functions in certain areas, as it does not enforce law and order, there are no police in villages and in some regions the situation is similar to the American Wild West of 150 years ago". To explain the creation of the xenophobic and racist paramilitary organization, Magyar Garda, Orban does not veer from his matter-of-fact tone: "People have taken the law into their own hands and the creation of the Magyar Garda is one of the consequences". Reassuring voters in a manner reminiscient of the police-state promised by Jobbik, Orban promises that "the existence of any paramilitary organization will become unnecessary once Fidesz takes power because there will be a sufficient number of police everywhere". Notice that Orban does not condemn or disapprove of Magyar Garda in any way, shape, or form; he only promises that an increased police force will obviate the "need" for Magyar Garda to exist. If Orban regains power, a rejuvenated Hungarian police can replace Magyar Garda in its role protecting ethnic Hungarians from minorities. How comforting.
Magyar Garda's formation is not the only eyebrow-raiser on the Hungarian political scene. Last week, Justice Minister Tibor Draskovics completed an investigation into the cooperation deal between the TMRSZ (Ready-To-Act Trade Union) and Jobbik. A powerful group with almost 5,000 members in the police force, TMRSZ's ties to the extreme right create problems for the law enforcement community. Concerned about the effects of a radical, right-wing trade union within the police force, the national police chief initiated legal proceedings against TMRSZ a few weeks ago. Due to the conflict of interest and rabidly nationalist political content engendered by the trade union's deal with Jobbik, the trade union was declared unlawful. As Geza Pongo remarked in a press release, a policeman will have a hard time fighting the Magyar Garda, the paramilitary arm of Jobbik, if he shares a political platform sanctioning their existence with them. But TMRSZ leader and MEP hopeful Judit Szima can't be bothered with such technicalities when the hostile forces of "worldwide Jewry" threaten to destroy the Hungarian nation. The imagined threat of the "Other" seems far more likely to destroy Hungary than the protocols of the Elders of Zion.
For more on the multitudes within current Hungarian politics:
- "Third Way Platform: The Nationalist Right Gets Together", 17 October 2005.
- To understand why Jobbik includes the Arpad stripe flag on its political platform, this article from Der Spiegel provides the historical and anti-Semitic context for these new national symbols.
- To learn more about public support for Magyar Garda, read this.
- For more about Hungary in general, The Economist sates the hungry mind.
- For a comparative look at the different approaches to post-communist transitions, try this brief by Anders Aslund.
- For the most vivid treatment of the TMRSZ controversy, see Yehuda Lahav's article.
- Extra-parliamentary political extremists in Hungary, including various neo-Nazi groups.
- "Far Right tries to take control of the revolt", The Times, 23 September 2006.
- "Roma bear the brunt of Hungary's economic downturn", Thomas Escritt, Financial Times, 19 Feb. 2009.